In a military campaign that mirrored operations to break resistance elsewhere in Syria, the final days of opposition-held eastern Ghouta were marked by heavy Russian and Syrian airpower and artillery upon a weary citizenry and a defiant opposition. As one town after another within the pocket retreated, attacking forces took increasingly drastic measures to demoralize and break the resistant rebel element with an overwhelming display of conventional, incendiary, and, eventually, chemical firepower.
The indiscriminate nature of the military action was consistent with a continuous trend deployed by regime forces attempting to bring pockets of resistance to heel. Across Syria, unguided weapons have been used against heavily populated urban areas, and Ghouta was no exception.
Dishonest use of a de-escalation agreement served only to free up government military assets to advance where they saw fit, while front lines were virtually frozen elsewhere. By the end of the siege on eastern Ghouta, hundreds of civilians had lost their lives in the final assault, and tens of thousands more had been forcefully displaced by the Assad regime. Just as the regime’s attention turned to the Damascus suburbs in February after the conclusion of a major regime offensive elsewhere, after the breaking of Ghouta, the regime headed south towards Daraa.
Protests first erupted in eastern Ghouta in the largest city in the area, Douma, on April 1, 2011. The protesters were met with live gunfire.[1] In September of that year, locals formed the first Free Syrian Army “battalion” of eastern Ghouta, the Abu Ubaida Bin Jarrah Battalion.[2] In October-November 2012, local rebels launched several attacks on Damascus and were able to consolidate control over the eastern outskirts of the capital.[3] The growing involvement of Lebanese Hezbollah in the Syrian civil war helped the government consolidate its control over crucial areas in Homs and surrounding Damascus, and in April 2013, government forces backed by Hezbollah were able to capture the strategic town of al-Otaiba, the last supply route into the enclave.[4] In August 2013, the government tightened the siege on eastern Ghouta by shuttering the last crossings used by civilians in Douma and Mleha to travel in and out of Ghouta.[5] The same month, on August 21, the Syrian government launched the most lethal chemical weapons attack of the entire Syrian civil war against eastern Ghouta. This attack saw the delivery of sarin gas payloads using surface-to-surface rockets, in a move then-United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon termed “a war crime and a grave violation of the 1925 Protocol and other rules of customary international law.”[6] There are differing estimates of the death toll. The UN itself spoke of “significant quantities” of sarin causing “mass casualties.”[7] Sources on the ground put the number of dead on the order of 1,500.[8]
In September 2013, at least fifty groups in the Damascus area merged with the Islam Brigade, a rebel group established by the Alloush family in Douma. Together, these factions formed Jaish al-Islam (the Army of Islam).[9] The second-largest faction operating in Ghouta was Faylaq al-Rahman (The Corps of the Merciful One), which adopted both nationalist and Islamic rhetoric. The group branded itself as part of the Free Syrian Army.[10] The origin of the group was with the formation of al-Baraa Brigade in August 2012. Several local rebel groups, including al-Baraa Brigade, merged in late 2013 to form Faylaq al-Rahman.[11] Other small factions included the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Islamist Ahrar al-Sham.
From this point on, there was a stalemate of sorts, with smaller clashes and offensives taking place, but with territorial boundaries between armed-opposition control and government control remaining reasonably static. The war profiteering surrounding the siege economy and operation of tunnels and crossings, struggles for power and dominance, and regime manipulations contributed to several rounds of infighting among eastern Ghouta’s factions.[12] The Assad regime exploited the rebels’ divisions to great effect. In February and March 2016, the regime denied UN aid convoys access to Douma, Harasta, Arbin, Zamalka, and Zabadin.[13] However, on February 23, and March 4 and 7, it granted access to the UN and the Syria Arab Red Crescent convoys heading for Kafr Batna, Ein Terma, Saqba, Jisreen, and Hammura with aid for some 46,800 people. All of these neighborhoods were exclusively controlled by Faylaq al-Rahman and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, stoking preexisting tensions with Jaish al-Islam in Douma, which was denied aid for any of its territories. The infighting, war profiteering, and authoritarian conduct of the rebel factions all contributed to widespread dissatisfaction with the rebels among Ghouta’s civilians.[14]
Following a particularly deadly round of infighting in mid-2017, eastern Ghouta became effectively divided among the various rebel factions, with each group setting up checkpoints to restrict the movement of people between the different fiefdoms inside the enclave.[15] Ghouta became divided into two enclaves: one centered in Douma and the eastern section of the enclave under the control of Jaish al-Islam, and the other, the southwestern sector, under the control of Faylaq al-Rahman and partial control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.[16] The town of Harasta came to be controlled by Ahrar al-Sham.[17]
Truces and Cease-Fires
During the fourth round of talks between the Astana guarantors––Iran, Turkey, and the Russian Federation––in the Kazakh capital on May 4, 2017, an agreement was reached to establish a series of “de-escalation zones” in Syria.[18] The four armed-opposition controlled zones agreed on included Idlib Province, an enclave in northern Homs, eastern Ghouta, and an area in the south of Syria that included parts of Quneitra and Daraa Provinces.[19]
The agreement was the latest in a long series of attempted cease-fires, reaching back over three years. In early 2014, negotiations had been attempted with eastern Ghouta’s opposition. On January 6, 2014, the neighborhood of Barzeh reached a truce deal with the Syrian government after an exhausting siege.[20] The truce agreement allowed rebels to maintain their checkpoints in the enclave. An unofficial truce followed for the neighboring Qaboun, which, along with Barzeh, came to be an important point for smuggling goods into eastern Ghouta.[21] While no formal agreement with Ghouta was reached, it was long suspected that an informal agreement was in play between the government and the armed opposition.
On February 27, 2016, a nationwide cease-fire went into effect in Syria, covering more than one hundred rebel factions.[22] Just three days later, local sources claimed that Assad’s forces and pro-government militias had taken advantage of the cease-fire to amass on the strategic hill of Farazat, capturing it.[23] A similar chain of events unfolded two months later. On April 29, 2016, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) General Command announced that it would be enacting a cease-fire on April 30. The cease-fire, referred to as a “regime of calm,” covered eastern Ghouta for twenty-four hours and the northern Latakia countryside for seventy-two hours.[24] On Monday, May 2, regime forces announced that they would extend the truce another forty-eight hours.[25] Instead of observing the extended truce, however, government forces took advantage of rebel infighting and resumed their attacks on the Deir al-Asafir salient in the south of the pocket, collapsing it on May 20.[26] The SAA advances meant that eastern Ghouta lost a significant portion of its farmland, further jeopardizing its inhabitants.[27] At the very end of that year, on December 30, another cease-fire went into effect, which only a select group of rebel factions ascribed to; these included Jaish al-Islam and the pocket’s small number of Ahrar al-Sham fighters.[28]
After broad agreement about the principle of de-escalation at the Astana talks in July 2017, localized negotiations for each de-escalation zone were managed location by location.[29] Shortly after these talks, on July 22, an agreement was reached for the eastern Ghouta safe zone mechanism. The last of the four de-escalation zones was put into effect after another round of talks in Astana that September.[30] The zones were envisioned to be in effect for six months with the possibility of renewal, but eastern Ghouta suffered its first civilian casualties in heavy aerial bombing just days after the agreement was reached.[31] Battle events did dip slightly in the area after July 2017, but surged again by December of that year.[32]
On November 28, 2017, the day scheduled for the eighth round of Geneva talks, the Syrian government announced a cease-fire for eastern Ghouta without addressing the existing de-escalation agreement it had repeatedly breached.[33] UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura greeted the announcement with some skepticism, noting that a cease-fire was offered, but that it remained to be seen if it would take place.[34] De Mistura later cited the biggest obstacle in negotiations as being “trust.”[35] In spite of the truce, heavy shelling continued in eastern Ghouta.[36] As had occurred in Aleppo and eastern Ghouta before,[37] the cease-fire was almost certainly announced as means of creating a smoke screen between the political process and facts on the ground.
While the de-escalation zones were ostensibly in place to aid the peace process, their primary utility for the Assad regime was to allow the SAA and its allied forces breathing space to concentrate their military efforts one by one against opposition-held locations around the country, including the areas covered by the de-escalation zones. In May 2017, the SAA launched a campaign to reclaim the eastern and southeastern borders, while the government offensive to close the rebel pocket running tunnels from Damascus to eastern Ghouta was winding down.[38] Government forces returned to the offensive in and around northern Hama in October 2017, before intensifying their attacks on eastern Ghouta.[39] In December 2017, after recapturing Deir al-Zour and severing the salient off the southern side of the Euphrates River, Assad set his sights on the Syrian northwest. With the help of Russian airpower and Iranian militias, government forces regained control of a large stretch of opposition-held territory, eventually capturing Abu al-Duhur military airport in Syria’s northwest by January 20, 2018, forcing more than 212,000 people to flee their homes in the process.[40] One by one, the de-escalation zones allowed Assad to concentrate his depleted forces for decisive offensives.
From there, the attention of Assad’s forces turned to eastern Ghouta, and a renewed military offensive, with little concern for other front lines, as was the case during the previous six months.[41] On February 18, 2018, the Syrian forces and their backers began a full-scale assault on the de-escalation zone of eastern Ghouta.[42] On February 24, with the air offensive already underway, the UN Security Council unanimously voted in favor of a thirty-day cease-fire in Syria, demanding that the siege in eastern Ghouta, among others, be lifted.[43] Undeterred, Syrian government forces launched a series of ground assaults on the enclave, starting the following day.[44]
Overall Military Strategy
A defining practice of the battle for eastern Ghouta, and for the Assad regime more generally, was characterized by three main stages that have been repeated time and time again since the offensive in Darayya in August 2016: besiege, bombard, and displace. The first stage was tightening the siege of the already encircled area and weakening the morale and physical health of the targeted fighters, at enormous costs to the civilian population. Following the tightening of siege, the attackers launched intensive offensive operations, characterized by the use of heavy bombardment from the ground and the air to break the rebels’ defensive lines and willingness to resist, followed by ground assaults. Finally, after it became evident that an SAA victory was inevitable, the Assad regime offered surrender deals to the rebels, and displaced them and civilians refusing to surrender to the regime north to rebel-held areas, in a capitulation process facilitated by Russian forces.
They did this while holding defensive lines elsewhere. The Liwa al-Quds (Quds/Jerusalem Brigade) was engaged on the front lines of Idlib Province the month prior to arriving in Damascus Province for the offensive against eastern Ghouta.[45] Likewise, Suheil al-Hassan’s Tiger Forces were involved in this offensive prior to moving manpower to eastern Ghouta.[46] In an article for the Russian magazine Military-Industrial Courier, the former commander of Russian forces in Syria, Aleksandr Dvornikov, took note of the usefulness of these types of irregular units, noting their higher combat preparedness compared with regular SAA units.[47] Once they claimed victory in one area, they focused on the next. After the fall of Ghouta, they headed to Syria’s south.
On February 18, 2018, the final operation against eastern Ghouta commenced, as government forces and their allies unleashed overwhelming firepower against the suburbs to soften up resistance for the impeding ground assault. This campaign of intense bombardment by air and artillery continued through February 25, when the ground assault on eastern Ghouta began. The first major breakthrough was in the south of the eastern Ghouta pocket, in which regime forces took Hawsh al-Dawahra on February 28. Shortly afterward, the SAA collapsed the salient of Nashabiyah, the southeastern-most point of the pocket, with the capture of the connecting town of Utaya.
Pro-Assad forces continued a steady advance along this vector, receiving significant fire support when confronted with major entrenched positions. This advance continued until March 12, when the rebel enclave in eastern Ghouta was split into three pockets: Douma under Jaish al-Islam control, Harasta under Ahrar Al-Sham, and the Faylaq al-Rahman–controlled cluster of towns that once comprised the western area of the pocket (also known as the “central sector”). At this point, as defeat appeared inevitable, each pocket was forced into submission, with the help of Russian negotiators.
The last enclave to resist the onslaught of the SAA and its allies was Douma, which would last significantly longer, holding out into April. As the western enclave folded on March 23, Douma saw heavy bombardment. This came both in the form of conventional artillery and air strikes, and incendiary strikes.[48] A week later, the SAA issued a forty-eight-hour ultimatum for the rebels to leave Ghouta or face a renewed military offensive.[49]
On April 6, 2018, regime forces pummeled Douma with artillery relentlessly. A mountain ridge north of Douma was a perfect location to deploy artillery units on an elevated position. Relentless pummeling of the town was recorded in a video by artillery soldiers themselves.[50] Through the next two days, the ferocity of the air and artillery attacks on the suburb were enormous. Gas attacks killed at least seventy civilians and affected hundreds on April 7.[51] On April 8, a deal was reached between Jaish al-Islam and the government. Assad ended the chapter of Syria’s resistance in eastern Ghouta using the cruelest methods .
On Thursday, April 12, the regime of Bashar al-Assad raised its flag over the ruins of the city of Douma, the final pocket of eastern Ghouta.[52] Douma had managed to hold out for only a few weeks after the central sector of eastern Ghouta fell. A total of 1,473 civilian deaths were recorded in the last thirty days of the siege and campaign, and 158,000 people were displaced from their homes.[53]
Negotiations and Forced Evacuation
The government implemented a surrender or die strategy in the rebel enclave,[54] reducing large areas of its towns to rubble with air strikes and artillery fire, while keeping the offer of “reconciliation” or evacuation open. Once the government had whittled down rebel territory to three isolated pockets, each controlled by a different rebel group, it pursued separate reconciliation deals with each.[55]
The first deal brokered by Russia with a rebel group was reached with Ahrar al-Sham on March 18, and displacement began on February 22.[56] While this population transfer took place, the Syrian and Russian governments’ pressure intensified on the western pocket, including by carrying out heavy incendiary raids.[57] These incendiary attacks began on March 20 and continued through the night of March 22.[58] Under heavy bombing from both conventional and incendiary munitions, the Damascus suburbs of Arbin, Zamalka, and Ein Tarma and the neighborhood of Jobar finally surrendered and agreed to a forced evacuation deal on March 23.[59]
More than 4,500 people, including 1,400 fighters, left Harasta for opposition-held Idlib in convoys of green buses, which have become symbolic of Assad’s forced displacement doctrine.[60] Seventeen buses left Harasta, and twenty-five buses from Arbin.[61] Two out of three rebel groups that controlled the enclave since 2013 had already surrendered, with thousands of fighters and their relatives departing for Idlib as part of the evacuation deal between the Russian army and two main rebel groups in the area.[62]
A week later, the SAA issued a forty-eight-hour ultimatum for the rebels to leave Ghouta or face a renewed military offensive.[63] Shortly after, news appeared suggesting that Russia had struck a deal with rebels in the main town of the eastern Ghouta region to allow civilians to leave along with fighters.[64] Three convoys, carrying 2,350 Jaish al-Islam fighters and their families[65] to opposition-held Idlib, were completed before April 5, when the SAA resumed its bombardment of Douma, claiming that rebels had halted the displacement process.[66] Jaish al-Islam had been in talks with the Russian army over the town’s fate. The armed group’s wish to act as a regime auxiliary force in Douma, and its insistence on retaining its heavy weapons, hampered negotiations.[67] This prospect did not suit the Syrian government.[68] On April 7, 2018, Douma was struck by chemical weapons, killing dozens of civilians and affecting hundreds more. The following day, April 8, Jaish al-Islam surrendered and agreed to a forced relocation to opposition-held territory in the north.[69] The Syrian government dismissed the attacks as a “fabrication” in spite of global outrage.[70] The Russian army struck a deal with Jaish al-Islam to withdraw about eight thousand of its fighters and some forty thousand of their relatives leaving for the northern province of Idlib; in exchange, Jaish al-Islam would release hostages it had been holding.[71]
By April 22, 2018, more than 158,000 people had been displaced from eastern Ghouta since March 9, approximately 66,000 of whom were evacuated to opposition-held areas in Idlib and Aleppo, according to UN estimates.[72]
Russia’s Involvement
Russia’s support has been crucial to Assad’s survival both on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena. Diplomatically, Russia has used its UN Security Council veto eleven times to shield Syria from accountability.[73] On February 24, 2018, the Security Council passed a resolution[74] calling for a thirty-day cease-fire in eastern Ghouta to allow in humanitarian aid and stop indiscriminate attacks on civilians, as required by international law. But the resolution had no appreciable impact on the ground. Russia refused to apply the truce to eastern Ghouta and launched a separate proposal for daily five-hour humanitarian truces.[75] That proposal also made no difference on the ground, and was widely dismissed as a way of shifting the discussion away from the terms of the UN resolution.[76]
The Russian air force actively joined the fight at the end of September 2015. The air cover of the Russian military was crucial in helping pro-Iranian militias, Syrian militias, and the SAA to besiege and then retake east Aleppo in 2016.[77] Russia was ready to provide assistance when eastern Ghouta’s time came to be recaptured.
In Ghouta, their attacks started on February 19, 2018;[78] on February 21, the Russian military announced that talks to try to peacefully resolve the situation had broken down as rebels had ignored calls to cease resistance.[79] On the same day, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described accusations that Russia bears some of the blame for civilian deaths in eastern Ghouta as “groundless.”[80]
The Syrian government and Russia denied dropping indiscriminate barrel bombs from helicopters, whose use was condemned by the UN.[81] Nonetheless, DFRLab’s monitoring of the conflict also concluded that many of the aircraft hitting eastern Ghouta belonged to the Russian air force.[82] A variety of Syrian civilian-provided videos suggest Russian air force involvement in the attacks as early as February 2018. For example, a video[83] posted by the Ghouta Media Center claimed the location of one particular bombing was the town of Zamalka in eastern Ghouta. DFRLab’s geolocation data analysis confirmed the location was, in fact, most likely Zamalka.[84] Furthermore, the same video also captured the aircraft responsible for dropping the ordnance —a Russian Sukhoi Su-34 (NATO reporting name: Fullback). The Syrian air force does not possess this type of plane, but Russia reportedly[85] deployed Su-34 to Syria as early as September 2015. The aircraft has also been recorded[86] via satellite imagery over Hmeimim Air Base.
On April 12, the Syrian government army took full control over the city of Douma, mustering all of eastern Ghouta under the control of the government forces.[87] Russian military police were deployed to Douma on the same day, in accordance with the rebel surrender deal. According to the Russian military, these forces were deployed to prevent provocations and guarantee security—to support law and order and organize aid for the local population. Russian military police oversaw the transition of the Douma territory to the government forces.[88] The military victory was Assad’s, but it was Russia’s military might that had enabled it.
[1] “At Least 10 Killed in Syria,” Ynet News, April 01, 2011, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4050879,00.html.; الجزيرة, “قتلى بتفريق مظاهرات قرب دمشق,” Al Jazeera, 01.04.2011, http://bit.ly/2pp4J1t.
[2] Damascus Countryside, Facebook, March 30, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/DamasCountryside.Now/posts/612114118874999.
[3] Yassin al-Haj Saleh, “Living under Assad’s Siege,” New York Times, February 08, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/opinion/syria-bombing-assad.html.
[4] “Syrian Army Seizes Strategic Town Near Capital,” Reuters, April 24, 2013, https://www.voanews.com/a/fighting-in-syria-lays-siege-to-historic-mosque/1648130.html.;“Syria: Children under Attack in Damascus Enclave,” Human Rights Watch, January 11, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/11/syria-children-under-attack-damascus-enclave.
[5] Amnesty International report “Syria: ‘Left to Die under Siege’: War crimes and human right abuses in Eastern Ghouta, Syria,” August 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2420792015ENGLISH.PDF.
[6] United Nations, United Nations Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Security Council on the Report of the United Nations Missions to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons on the Incident that Occurred on 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta Area of Damascus. 16 September 2013, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2013-09-16/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-report-united-nations.
[7] United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 25/65, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014,) http://www.refworld.org/docid/53182eed4.html.
[8] “Bodies Still Being Found after Alleged Syria Chemical Attack: Opposition,” Daily Star Lebanon, August 22, 2013, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Aug-22/228268-bodies-still-being-found-after-alleged-syria-chemical-attack-opposition.ashx.; “Syria/Syrian Chemical Programme – National Executive Summary of Declassified Intelligence,” French Foreign Ministry, September 03, 2013, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Syrian_Chemical_Programme.pdf.
[9] Hassan Hassan, “The Army of Islam Is Winning in Syria,” Foreign Policy, October 01, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/01/the-army-of-islam-is-winning-in-syria/.
[10] Aron Lund, “Understanding Eastern Ghouta in Syria,” IRIN News, February 23, 2018, https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2018/02/23/understanding-eastern-ghouta-syria.
[11] الجزيرة, “ما هو فيلق الرحمن؟,” 22.08.2017, https://bit.ly/2OJXLPL.
[12] Aron Lund, “The Syrian Rebel Who Tried to Build an Islamist Paradise,” Politico, March 31, 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/the-syrian-rebel-who-built-an-islamic-paradise-214969.
[13] United Nations, Security Council, Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and 2258 (2015), S/2016/272, (23 March 2016), available from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1607835-2.pdf.
[14] Elizabeth Tsurkov, “The Breaking of Syria’s Rebellion,” The Forum for Regional Thinking, July 10, 2018, http://www.regthink.org/en/articles/the-breaking-of-syrias-rebellion.
[15] Noura Hourani, Waleed Khaled a-Noufal, and Justin Schuster, “East Ghouta’s Rebel Infighting Spills over to Embattled Civilians: ‘The Factions Are Sowing Hatred,’” Syria Direct, May 16, 2018, https://syriadirect.org/news/east-ghouta%E2%80%99s-rebel-infighting-spills-over-to-embattled-civilians-%E2%80%98the-factions-are-sowing-hatred%E2%80%99/.
[16] Aron Lund, “Understanding Eastern Ghouta in Syria,” IRIN News, February 23, 2018, https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2018/02/23/understanding-eastern-ghouta-syria.
[17] “Fajr al-Umma Brigade and the Islamic Movement of Ahrar al-Sham Merge in the Eastern Ghouta,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, May 12, 2017, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=66297.
[18] “Memorandum on the Creation of De-escalation Areas in the Syrian Arab Republic,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, May 06, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2746041.;“Fourth Round of Astana Talks on Syria Ends with De-escalation Zones Deal,” TASS, May 05, 2017, http://tass.com/world/944724.
[19] “Syria’s ‘De-escalation Zones’ Explained,” Al Jazeera, July 04, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/syria-de-escalation-zones-explained-170506050208636.html.
[20] Sadek Abed Alrahman and Karen Leigh, “In Barzeh, Two Versions of a Truce,” News Deeply, March 10, 2014, https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2014/03/10/in-barzeh-two-versions-of-a-truce.
[21] Jana Salem, “Hamesh Checkpoint: Business in the Time of Truce,” April 17, 2017, https://www.aljumhuriya.net/en/content/hameesh-checkpoint-business-time-truce.
[22] Samer Abboud, “Syria War: What You Need to Know about the Ceasefire,” Al Jazeera, February 28, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/syria-war-ceasefire-160228063752872.html.
[23] “كيف استغلت قوات الأسد هدنة وقف إطلاق النار في الغوطة الشرقية؟,” Alsouria.net, 01.03.216, https://goo.gl/cG3kGM.
[24] “Syria Declares ‘Regime of Calm’ in Two Major Areas,” ParsToday, April 29, 2016, http://parstoday.com/en/news/middle_east-i10603-syria_declares_’regime_of_calm’_in_two_major_areas.
[25] Patrick Strickland, “Syrian Army ‘Violates’ Ghouta Truce as Rebels Clash,” Al Jazeera, May 03, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-ghouta-ceasefire-160503083045131.html.
[26] LiveUAMaps, Twitter (archived), May 20, 2016, https://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/20-may-drone-footage-of-the-areas-captured-by-the-saa–allies.
[27] Waleed Khaled a-Noufa et al., “East Ghouta Loses Its Breadbasket: ‘The Regime Exploited the Ongoing Infighting,’” Syria Direct, May 19, 2016, https://syriadirect.org/news/east-ghouta-loses-its-breadbasket-%E2%80%98the-regime-exploited-the-ongoing-infighting%E2%80%99/.
[28] “List of Armed Formations, Which Joined the Ceasefire in the Syrian Arab Republic on December 30, 2016,” Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, December 29, 2016, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/[email protected].
[29] Emma Beals, “De-Escalation and Astana,” Atlantic Council, SyriaSource, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/de-escalation-and-astana.
[30] “Russia Says It Has Agreed Safe Zone Mechanism with Syrian Rebels,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 22, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-syria-rebels-safe-zone-mechanisms-ghouta/28632161.html.;“Final De-escalation Zones Agreed on in Astana,” Al Jazeera, September 15, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/final-de-escalation-zones-agreed-astana-170915102811730.html.
[31] “Air Strikes, Shelling Strain Moscow-Backed Damascus Truce,” Reuters, July 25, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-ghouta/air-strikes-shelling-strain-moscow-backed-damascus-truce-idUSKBN1AA0JV.
[32] “Violence in Syria’s De-escelation Zones,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, April 12, 2018, https://www.acleddata.com/2018/04/12/violence-in-syrias-de-escalation-zones/.
[33] “Syria War: Government ‘Agrees to Eastern Ghouta Truce,’” BBC, November 28, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42156499.
[34] “Syrian Government Team to Arrive in Geneva for Peace Talks on Wednesday,” Reuters, November 28, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-talks/syrian-government-team-to-arrive-in-geneva-for-peace-talks-on-wednesday-idUSKBN1DS0RE.
[35] “Syrian Talks in Geneva to Continue to Dec 15: UN Envoy,” China Daily, December 01, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-12/01/content_35150939.htm.
[36] “Rebel Area Near Damascus Hit by Heavy Shelling despite Two-Day Truce,” Al Jazeera, November 29, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-ceasefire/rebel-area-near-damascus-hit-by-heavy-shelling-despite-two-day-truce-idUSKBN1DT1D1.
[37] Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung, “Syrian Cease-Fire Backed by U.S. and Russia Gets Off to Rocky Start,” Washington Post, September 12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ceasefire-in-syria-set-to-take-hold-as-scores-die-in-air-strikes/2016/09/12/c93bbf4e-7850-11e6-8064-c1ddc8a724bb_story.html.;Jamie Dettmer, “Syrian Government Warplanes Breach Truce for 2nd Day,” Voice of America, July 25, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/syria-airstrikes-cease-fire/3958293.html.
[38] “Syrian Army Retakes Most of Rebel-Held District on Edge of Damascus,” Al Arabiya English, May 13, 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/05/13/Deal-reached-to-evacuate-rebel-held-Damascus-district.html.;“Syria Army ‘Moves into Area’ Where Rebels Evicted ISIL,” Al Jazeera, May 15, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/syria-army-moves-area-rebels-evicted-isil-170515043533965.html.
[39] Hashem Osseiram, “How De-escalation Zones in Syria Became a War Management Strategy,” Syria Deeply, February 06, 2018, https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2018/02/06/how-de-escalation-zones-in-syria-became-a-war-management-strategy.
[40] “Syrian Army, Allies Capture Idlib Air Base: State TV,” Reuters, January 20, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-airport/syrian-army-allies-capture-idlib-air-base-state-tv-idUSKBN1F90M7.
[41] Hashem Osseiram, “How De-escalation Zones in Syria Became a War Management Strategy,” Syria Deeply, February 06, 2018, https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2018/02/06/how-de-escalation-zones-in-syria-became-a-war-management-strategy.
[42] Samuel Osborne, “Syrian Civil War: Assad Regime Air Strikes Kill 71 and Wound 325 in 24 Hours, Says Monitoring Group,” Independent, February 19, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-civil-war-assad-regime-killed-air-striked-wounded-eastern-ghouta-rebel-damascus-a8218001.html.
[43] United Nations, Security Council, UN Security Council Agrees 30-Day Ceasefire in Syria. 24 February 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/02/1003501.
[44] “Syrian Forces Begin New Offensive in Eastern Ghouta,” Al Jazeera, February 25, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/syrian-forces-offensive-eastern-ghouta-180225071935104.html.; Ellen Francis and Andrew Bolton, “Syrian Government Ground Forces Attack Ghouta despite Russian Truce Plan,” Reuters, February 28, 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-ghouta/syrian-government-ground-forces-attack-ghouta-despite-russian-truce-plan-idUKKCN1GC0VD.
[45] Syrian Reporter, Twitter, January 17, 2018, https://twitter.com/ReporterSyrien/status/953683929315209216.
[46] “Video: Tiger Forces Make Their Way from Eastern Syria to Northern Hama ahead of Large Offensive,” Al-Masadar News, December 20, 2017, https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/video-tiger-forces-make-way-eastern-syria-northern-hama-ahead-large-offensive/.
[47] Aleksandr Dvornikov, “Штабы для новых войн,” ВПК, July 23, 2018, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/43971.
[48] Qalaat Al Mudiq, Twitter, March 23, 2018, https://twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/977171593775509504.; Mohammed Ghorab, Twitter, March 23, 2018, https://twitter.com/MGhorab3/status/976958192931540992.
[49] Danny Makki, Twitter, March 30, 2018, https://twitter.com/Dannymakkisyria/status/979814451992985600.
[50] Andriukaitis, “#PutinAtWar: Rebels Burned Out of Eastern Ghouta,” Atlantic Council, Digital Forensic Research Lab, via Medium, April 04, 2018, https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-rebels-burned-out-of-eastern-ghouta-e0769667992d.
[51] “Syria Chemical Attack: Scores Killed in Douma, Rescuers Say,” Al Jazeera, April 08, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/suspected-chemical-attack-kills-dozens-syria-douma-180407202906316.html.
[52] “Syrian Government Forces Have Reportedly Taken Control of Douma,” Reuters, April 12, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/syrian-forces-take-douma_us_5acf2573e4b0701783aba9ca.
[53] OCHA report “Syrian Arab Republic: East Ghouta,” ReliefWeb, May 3, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/East%20Ghouta%20SitRep_No.5.pdf.; “Eastern Ghouta: What Happened and Why,” Al Jazeera, April 13, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/eastern-ghouta-happening-180226110239822.html.
[54] “More Rebels and Civilians Abandon Syria’s Eastern Ghouta,” DW, March 24, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/more-rebels-and-civilians-abandon-syrias-eastern-ghouta/a-43115234.
[55] “Over 105,000 Civilians Have Fled Syria’s Eastern Ghouta,” France 24, March 23, 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180324-syria-eastern-ghouta-civilians-fled-rebels-militants.
[56] “Syria war: First Rebels Leave Defeated Eastern Ghouta Town,” BBC News, March 22, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43500234.
[57] Qalaat Al Mudiq, Twitter, March 21, 2018, https://twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/976364542304415744.
[58] Free Syrian Army News, Twitter, March 20, 2018, https://twitter.com/FSAPlatform/status/976103547489128448.
[59] Louisa Loveluck, “Syrian Rebels Agree to Evacuation from Desperately Besieged Enclave,” Washington Post, March 23, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-rebels-agree-to-evacuation-from-desperately-besieged-enclave/2018/03/23/7255d024-2e08-11e8-8dc9-3b51e028b845_story.html?utm_term=.d6e52ce713e7.
[60] “Over 105,000 Civilians Have Fled Syria’s Eastern Ghouta,” France 24, March 23, 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180324-syria-eastern-ghouta-civilians-fled-rebels-militants.
[61] “Eastern Ghouta Evacuations: Thousands to Be Bused to Idlib,” Al Jazeera, March 25, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/eastern-ghouta-evacuations-thousands-bused-idlib-180325094113482.html.
[62] “Eastern Ghouta Evacuations: Thousands to Be Bused to Idlib,” Al Jazeera, March 25, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/eastern-ghouta-evacuations-thousands-bused-idlib-180325094113482.html.
[63] Danny Makki, Twitter, March 30, 2018, https://twitter.com/Dannymakkisyria/status/979814451992985600.
[64] “Deal Reached to Evacuate Rebels from Syria’s Douma,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 01, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/syria-douma-deal-rebels-evacuate/29138534.html.
[65] “Syria: Government Takeover of Eastern Ghouta Near Complete,” Al Jazeera, April 05, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/syria-government-takeover-eastern-ghouta-complete-180405110513723.html.
[66] “Evacuation of Syria’s Douma Suspended over Disagreements,” AP News, April 05, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/101b05486bd042799f5c8b7bedd2ad16.
[67] Danny Makki, Twitter, April 07, 2018, https://twitter.com/dannymakkisyria/status/982383228295241728?lang=en.; “Douma Agreement Is Suspended and Talks and Negotiations Are Underway to Reach a “New Settlement” about Douma, the Eastern Qalamoun and Damascus,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, April 05, 2018, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=88579.
[68] Kareem Shaheen, “Dozens Killed in Suspected Chemical Attack on Syrian Rebel Enclave,” The Guardian, April 08, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/08/syrian-government-accused-of-chemical-attacks-on-civilians-in-eastern-ghouta.
[69] “Deal Reached to Surrender Last Rebel-Held Town in Eastern Ghouta,” Al Jazeera, April 08, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/deal-reached-surrender-rebel-held-town-eastern-ghouta-180408172342106.html.
[70] “Deal Reached to Surrender Last Rebel-Held Town in Eastern Ghouta,” Al Jazeera, April 08, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/deal-reached-surrender-rebel-held-town-eastern-ghouta-180408172342106.html.
[71] “Deal Reached to Surrender Last Rebel-Held Town in Eastern Ghouta,” Al Jazeera, April 08, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/deal-reached-surrender-rebel-held-town-eastern-ghouta-180408172342106.html.
[72] OCHA report “East Ghouta Humanitarian Update – Facts and Figures, 22 April 2018,” ReliefWeb, April 22, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/East%20Ghouta%20Facts%20and%20Figures%2022%20April.pdf.
[73] “Russia Backs Syria in Unlawful Attacks on Eastern Ghouta,” Human Rights Watch, March 18, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/18/russia-backs-syria-unlawful-attacks-eastern-ghouta.
[74] United Nations, Syria ‘bleeding Inside and Out’ as Conflict Enters Eighth Year, Says UN Chief. 12 March 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/03/1004742.
[75] Jamie Tarabay and Jomana Karadsheh, “Putin Orders Daily Pause in Fighting in Eastern Ghouta,” CNN, February 26, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/26/middleeast/syria-ceasefire-violation-ghouta-intl/index.html.
[76] Aron Lund, “Aleppo Again? A Plea to Save Lives in Eastern Ghouta,” The Century Foundation, December 21, 2017, https://tcf.org/content/commentary/aleppo-plea-save-lives-eastern-ghouta/.
[77] “Russia/Syria: War Crimes in Month of Bombing Aleppo,” Human Rights Watch, December 01, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/01/russia/syria-war-crimes-month-bombing-aleppo.
[78] “An Economic War Races the Military Attack on Eastern Ghouta,” Enab Baladi, February 28, 2018, https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2018/02/economic-war-races-military-attack-eastern-ghouta/.
[79] Maxim Rodionov and Andrew Osborn, “Talks to End Conflict in Syria’s Eastern Ghouta Break Down: Russia,” Reuters, February 21, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-ghouta-russia/talks-to-end-conflict-in-syrias-eastern-ghouta-break-down-russia-idUSKCN1G52ME.
[80] “Кремль отрицает причастность ВС РФ к гибели мирных жителей в Восточной Гуте,” TASS, February 21, 2018, https://tass.ru/politika/4978441.
[81] “Кремль отрицает причастность ВС РФ к гибели мирных жителей в Восточной Гуте,” TASS, February 21, 2018, https://tass.ru/politika/4978441.
[82] Lukas Andriukaitis, “#PutinAtWar: Further Signs of Russia’s Involvement in Eastern Ghouta,” Atlantic Council, Digital Forensic Research Lab, via Medium, March 23, 2018, https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-further-signs-of-russias-involvement-in-eastern-ghouta-c1a35e293e33.
[83] Ghouta Media Center, YouTube, February 17, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4aetDL6jRdM.
[84] Lukas Andriukaitis, “#PutinAtWar: Russia’s Involvement in Eastern Ghouta,” Atlantic Council, Digital Forensic Research Lab, via Medium, March 15, 2018, https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-russias-involvement-in-eastern-ghouta-60413a4b67ab.
[85] Daniel Brown, “These Are the 11 Types of Russian Military Jets and Planes Known to Be Stationed in Syria,” Business Insider, February 26, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-10-russian-military-aircraft-stationed-in-syria-2017-10.
[86] Google Maps, https://www.google.lv/maps/@35.4118036,35.9446577,300m/data=!3m1!1e3.
[87] “Syrian Military Takes Full Control over Eastern Ghouta,” TASS, April 12, 2018, http://tass.com/defense/999240.
[88] “Russia Calls UN Security Council Meeting on Syria,” Daily Sabah, April 12, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/syrian-crisis/2018/04/12/russia-calls-un-security-council-meeting-on-syria.
Attacks Overview
